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Abstract
Nowadays, organizations collect vast quantities of accounting relevant transactions,
referred to as ’journal entries’, in ’Enterprise Resource Planning’ (ERP) systems.
The aggregation of those entries ultimately defines an organization’s financial
statement. To detect potential misstatements and fraud, international audit standards
demand auditors to directly assess journal entries using ’Computer Assisted Audit
Techniques’ (CAATs). At the same time, discoveries in deep learning research
revealed that machine learning models are vulnerable to ’adversarial attacks’. It also
became evident that such attack techniques can be misused to generate ’deepfakes’
designed to directly attack the perception of humans by creating convincingly
altered media content. The research of such developments and their potential
impact on the finance and accounting domain is still in its early stage. We believe
that it is of vital relevance to investigate how such techniques could be maliciously
misused in this sphere. In this work, we show an adversarial attack against CAATs
using deep neural networks. We first introduce a real-world ’thread model’ designed
to camouflage accounting anomalies such as fraudulent journal entries. Second, we
show that adversarial autoencoder neural networks are capable of learning a human
interpretable model of journal entries that disentangles the entries latent generative
factors. Finally, we demonstrate how such a model can be maliciously misused by
a perpetrator to generate robust ’adversarial’ journal entries that mislead CAATs.
1 Introduction
Over the years, machine learning techniques, and in particular deep neural networks [36], created
advances across a diverse range of application domains such as image classification [34], speech
recognition [48], language translation [53] and game-play [51]. Due to their broad application,
these developments also raised awareness of the unsafe aspects of machine learning, which become
increasingly important. Intriguing discoveries in deep learning research revealed that a variety
of machine learning models, even simple regression models, are vulnerable and exhibit ’intrinsic
blind spots’. In computer vision, Szegedy et al. [54] and Goodfellow et al. [22] were among the
first who demonstrated that small perturbations added to an image, resulted in misclassifications
by machine learning models. Such perturbations, referred to as ’adversarial examples’, pose a
threat to a variety of real-world applications e.g. autonomous driving [16], speech recognition [3],
text generation [13] or reinforcement learning [26]. ’Adversarial attacks’ are deliberately designed
to exploit such vulnerabilities and cause a machine learning model to make a mistake. Recently,
another deep learning based attack type, referred to as ’deepfakes’, gained considerable attention [39].
Deepfakes denote convincingly manipulated media content, e.g., by altering its audio and video
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Figure 1: Exemplary audit ’thread model’ designed to camouflage accounting anomalies or fraudulent
activities. Regular journal entries are replaced or enriched by the injection of ’fake’ adversarial
entries deliberately sampled from a deep generative model.
content. Most of the alterations make a person appear to say or do something that the person never
said or did1. Instead of attacking a machine learning model, deepfakes are designed to directly target
a human viewers visual and acoustic perception. In the past, the creation of such altered media used
to be reserved for a small group of highly trained professionals. With the advent of deep adversarial
learning, it became broadly accessible within reach of almost any individual with a computer [24].
The early detection of such deepfakes is of high relevance in the context of societal disinformation
and are of serious concern in democratic discourses [44]. The research of the potential impact of
adversarial attacks and deepfakes in finance and accounting is still in an early stage. However, we
believe that it is of vital relevance to understand how adversarial deep learning techniques could be
maliciously misused in this sphere. This holds in particular for the creation of adversarial journal
entries to cover-up fraudulent2 activities that might remain undetected by state-of-the-art ’Computer
Assisted Audit Techniques’ (CAATs).
Nowadays, organizations collect vast quantities of accounting relevant transactions referred to
as ’journal entries’ in ’Enterprise Resource Planning’ (ERP) systems. The aggregation of those
entries ultimately comprise an organization’s financial statement. The trustworthiness of such
financial statements plays a fundamental role in the economic decision making of investors and
creditors [27]. CAATs are typically designed to gather reasonable assurance that the financial
statement of an organization is free from material misstatement (’true and fair presentation’) and
traces of fraud [1], [28]. To detect potential fraudulent activities, international audit standards require
the direct assessment of a financial statements underlying accounting records referred to as journal
entries [10]. The toolbox of applied CAATs, ranges from risk-oriented database queries [15], [14]
referred to as ’red-flag’ tests (e.g. queries for postings outside the usual office hours, multiple vendor
bank account changes, backdated expense account adjustments), over statistical and data mining
based approaches [8], [47] (e.g. Benford’s Law [6] or financial ratio analysis [52]) to more recent deep
learning inspired techniques [49] (e.g. autoencoder neural networks). However, even after uncovering
a novel fraudulent ’modus operandi’ using state-of-the-art CAATs, fraudsters continuously adapt
until these techniques result in the generation of false negatives again.
In the context of the rapid development of deep adversarial learning, this observation raises the
following questions: Are financial audits vulnerable to adversarial attacks? And if so, are state-of-the-
art CAATs able to detect such attacks? In this paper, we present a deep learning-based adversarial
attack against CAATs. We regard this work to be an initial step towards the investigation of such
future challenges in financial audits. In summary, we present the following contributions: (i) we
describe a real-world ’thread model’ designed to camouflage accounting anomalies or fraudulent
activities using adversarial entries; (ii) we show that deep neural networks can learn a model of journal
1BuzzFeedVideo, ’You Won’t Believe What Obama Says In This Video!’, Published 04/17/2018,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cQ54GDm1eL0.
2In accordance with [18] the term fraud here refers to the use of one’s occupation for personal enrichment
through the deliberate misuse or misapplication of the using organization’s resources or assets, e.g. the booking
of fictitious sales, fraudulent invoices, wrong recording of expenses.
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entries that semantically disentangles the entries latent generative factors; and, (iii) we demonstrate
how such a learned model can be maliciously misused by a potential perpetrator to create ’adversarial’
journal entries that are deliberately designed to misguide auditors CAATs during a financial audit.
2 Related work
Due to its threatening nature, adversarial attacks triggered a sizable body of research by practitioners
and academia [2], [11]. Several references propose detection and defense mechanisms to improve
the robustness of machine learning models against such attacks [40]. In the realm of this work, we
focus our literature survey on (i) adversarial attacks under real-world conditions, and (ii) deepfakes
designed to attack a humans perception.
Real World ’Adversarial-Attack’ Techniques: Kurakin et al. in [35] showed the robustness of
adversarial attacks in a real-world setup. They printed adversarial images and took snapshots of
the images using a cell-phone camera. It was shown that a significant fraction of the photos was
miss-classified by trained models when perceived through the camera. Etimov et al. in [16] built on
these attacks and studied distinct types of road-sign perturbations. They demonstrated that physical
perturbations, e.g., in the form of stickers added to road-signs, resulted in failures of the road-sign
recognition systems. Athalye et al. in [5] introduced a method for construction 3D objects able to
fool neural networks across a wide variety of angles and viewpoints. Papernot et al. in [45] showed
the first real-world black-box attacks against a set of remotely hosted neural network classifiers.
Using ’gradient-masking’ and attack calibration, the attacks resulted in a high fraction of miss-
classifications by the targeted networks. Similarly, Liu et al. in [37] showed that an ensemble of
targeted black-box attacks against an image classification web-service provider resulted in high rates
of misclassifications. In [23], Grosse et al. successfully attacked neural networks used as malware
classifiers with adversarial perturbed android applications. Melis et al. in [42] demonstrated the
vulnerability of robots to adversarial manipulations of input images. Xu et al. in [58] showed that
commonly used compositional and non-compositional ’Visual Question and Answer’ architectures
are vulnerable to adversarial attacks.
Real World ’Deepfake’ Techniques: Korshunova et al. in [33] used neural style transfer [19] to
conduct face-swapping of celebrities. Their model was trained on a dataset consisting over 200,000
celebrity face images and yield photorealistic results. Natsume et al. in [43] proposed an approach to
fuse random latent representations of the face and the hair regions of various headshot input images.
The results trained and evaluated on the same celebrity face dataset showed a high synthesis quality of
the swapped faces. Van den Oord et al. in [55] proposed the ’WaveNet’ architecture, an autoregressive
generative model, designed to learn realistic voice characteristics of 109 different speakers. Kobayashi
et al. [32] conditioned such autoregressive models on acoustic features determined by a Gaussian-
Mixture Models to convert the features of a source speaker into those of a random target speaker.
Zhou et al. in [59] successfully trained, a special RNN architecture named ’SampleRNNs’, to conduct
intra-gender and cross-gender voice conversions of four speakers and demonstrated their naturalness.
Chan et al. in [12] showed the application of generative models in transferring the motions of a person
captured in a source videos to a target person. The motion transfer was achieved by enhancing the
’Pix2PixHD’ architecture [56] and filming the target person to impose posses of professional dancers.
Kim et al. in [29] presented a methodology to transfer the full 3D head position, head rotation, face
expression, eye gaze, and the eye blinking from a source actor to a portrait video of a target actor.
More recently, Fried et al. in [17] showed a method to produce realistic videos in which the original
dialogue of the speaker has been modified.
To the best of our knowledge, this work presents the first analysis on the generation of adversarial
journal entries to attack real-world financial statement audits using deep neural networks.
3 Audit Threat Model
Most journal entries recorded within an organizations’ Enterprise Resource Planing (ERP) system
relate to regular day-to-day business activities, e.g., the posting of invoices, recording of payments,
or the booking of asset depreciation.
3.1 Classification of Audit Attacks
To conduct fraud, perpetrators need to deviate from the "normal". Such a deviating behavior will
be recorded by a minimal number of journal entries and their respective attribute values. We refer
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to journal entries exhibiting such deviating attribute values as accounting anomalies. In this initial
work, we introduce two attack classes designed to camouflage accounting anomalies, namely (a)
their replacement and (b) their augmentation. In the anomaly replacement scenario, anomalies are
removed and replaced by several adversarial journal entries. The adversarial journal entries intend
to camouflage the removed anomalous entries. This attack class is deliberately designed to target
rule-based CAATs, e.g., to cover up the circumvention of an invoice approval border in the ’procure
to pay’ process. In the anomaly augmentation scenario anomalies are supplemented by a set of
additional adversarial journal entries. The supplementary entries aim to let the anomalous entries
appear normal and not ’isolated’ in the entire population of journal entries. This attack class is
designed to target statistical CAATs, e.g., to cover up rarely used general ledger accounts, user
accounts, or document types. Both scenarios can be denoted as ’targeted’ [37] ’black-box’ [45]
attacks, where the adversary doesn’t have access to the auditors CAATs internals and fraudulent
entries should be miss-classified as false negatives.
3.2 Audit Attack Strategy
To establish such attacks, we introduce a threat model depicted in Fig. 1, in which a person or group
of people, referred to as the perpetrator, within an organization intends to camouflage fraudulent
activities: Based on its regular business activities, an organization records regular journal entries
in its ERP-system. To initiate the attack, a perpetrator will query the ERP system to extract the
journal entries recorded by the system (1). Afterward, the extracted entries are misused to learn
a deep disentangled model of their latent generative factors (2). Such a model could be learned
from a subset or all extracted entries, e.g., the latent generative factors of all invoice postings of
particular purchasing department and fiscal year (3). The model learned, is then exploited to sample
adversarial (’fake’) journal entries. The sampled adversarial entries are deliberately designed to
cover-up fraudulent activities (a) already recorded or (b) to be recorded by the system. Furthermore,
the sampling is conditioned on the disentangled latent generative factors to decrease the risk of being
detected by the auditors’ CAATS. The sampled adversarial entries are then posted in the productive
system to replace or augment the regular journal entries (4). During a financial audit, auditors usually
request a set or a subset of journal entries subject to the scope of the audit (5). Following, the
organization queries its ERP-System and provides the requested data including the (i) fraudulent and
(ii) adversarial entries to the auditor (6). We refer to such a data extract, including the adversarial
journal entries as adversarial extract. To ensure the completeness of the data received, auditors
usually reconcile the obtained data extract with publicly available information (7). For example, by
comparing the trial balances of the journal entries with the corresponding 10-K report published by
a regulatory body such as the ’Security and Exchange Commission’ (SEC). However, due to the
compliance of the adversarial journal entries with the learned generative latent factors, the entries
exhibit a high likelihood to remain undetected by the auditors CAATs.
4 Adversarial Accounting Model
Let formally X be a set of N journal entries x1, x2, ..., xn where each journal entry xi consists
of K attributes xi1, x
i
2, ..., x
i
j , ..., x
i
k. Thereby, x
i
j denotes the j
th attribute of the ith journal entry.
The individual attributes xj describe the journal entries accounting specific details, e.g., the entries
fiscal year, posting type, posting date, amount, general-ledger. We hypothesize that such entries
X are generated by unobservable (’latent’) factors of variation in Z that can be recovered by an
unsupervised deep learning algorithm [7]. Similarly to [9] we also assume that such factors constitute
a latent hierarchy. In this initial work, we distinguish between (a) high-order and (b) low-order latent
factors of variation. High-order latent factors originate from the entries general semantics such as the
underlying business process or organizational function, e.g., the variation of journal entry attributes
when comparing vendor invoice postings to depreciation postings or customer payment postings.
Low-order latent factors originate from the entries business transaction nuances or characteristics,
e.g., the variations of journal entry attributes when comparing vendor invoice postings in terms of
their posting time, the number of invoice line items, or the invoice amount. Directly calculating the
posterior distribution qd(z) over the latent factors in Z is often intractable [31]. We aim to learn
a model qθ(z|x) of a given set of journal entries that approximates the intractable posterior. To
achieve this, we use a deep neural network architecture referred to as Adversarial Autoencoder (AAE)
introduced by Makhzani et al. in [41]. We impose a deliberately chosen prior pn(z) when training
the AAE to obtain a human interpretable posterior distribution that disentangles the entries latent
4
Figure 2: The adversarial autoencoder architecture as introduced in [41], applied to learn a disentan-
gled and human interpretable representation of the journal entries generative latent factors.
generative factors. Once such a model is learned, it provides a human interpretable ’blueprint’ of how
to control the generation of robust adversarial journal entries.
4.1 Adversarial Autoencoder Networks
The AAE architecture, as shown in Fig. 2, extends the concept of Autoencoder Neural Networks
(AENs) [25] by imposing an arbitrary prior distribution pn(z) over the AENs latent factors in Z using
a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) training setup [21]. The AAE training is conducted jointly
in two phases, (a) a reconstruction phase and (b) an adversarial regularization phase executed on each
mini-batch. In the reconstruction phase, the AAE’s encoder network qθ(z|x) is trained to approximate
the intractable posterior of the entries latent generative factors. Given an arbitrary distribution of
journal entries pd(x) the to be learned posterior qd(z) is formally defined as follows:
qd(z) =
∫
x
qθ(z|x)pd(x)dx (1)
The AAE’S decoder network pθ(xˆ|z) is trained to reconstruct each entry xˆi based on its learned
latent representations zi ∈ Z as faithfully as possible by minimizing the entry’s reconstruction error.
In the regularization phase, an adversarial training setup is applied, were the encoder qθ(z|x) of the
AAE functions as generator network. Thereby a discriminator network dφ(z) is attached on top
of the learned latent code vector Z. Similarly to GANs, the discriminator network of the AAE is
trained to distinguish samples of an arbitrary imposed prior distribution pn(z) in Z from the learned
aggregated posterior distribution qd(z). In parallel, the encoder network is trained to learn a posterior
distribution pn(z) ≈ qd(z) that fools the discriminator network into thinking that samples drawn
from the posterior qd(z) originate from the imposed prior pn(z).
4.2 Datasets and Data Preparation
In general, SAP ERP systems record journal entries and their corresponding attributes predominantly
in two database tables: (a) the table ’Accounting Document Headers’ (technically: ’BKPF’) contains
the meta-information of a journal entry, such as document id, type, date, time, or currency, while (b)
the table ’Accounting Document Segments’ (technically: ’BSEG’) contains the entry details, such as
posting key, general ledger account, debit-credit information, or posting amount. In this work, we
extract a subset of the most discriminative journal entry attributes of the BKPF and BSEG table. In
our experiments, we use two datasets of journal entries: a real-world and a synthetic dataset referred
to as Data-A and Data-B in the following. Data-A is an extract of an SAP ERP instance and contains
a total of 307, 457 journal entry line items consisting of six categorical and two continuous attributes,
denoted as xcat and xcon respectively. The dataset encompasses the entire population of journal
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Figure 3: Exemplary prior distribution pn(x) consisting of a. 2D-grid of τ = 25 equidistant Gaussians
(left). Learned latent posterior distribution qd(z) that disentangles the journal entries high-order
factors of variation into the distinct Gaussians (middle). Learned low-order disentanglement of the
journal entries log-normalized local posting amounts of a single Gaussian (right).
entries of a single fiscal year3. Data-B is an excerpt of the synthetic dataset4 presented in [38] and
contains a total of 533, 009 journal entry line items.
4.3 Adversarial Autoencoder Training
Our architectural setup, shown in Fig. 2, follows the AAE architecture described in [41]. In the
training’s reconstruction phase, we use a combined loss LREθ as proposed in [50], when optimizing
the parameters θ of the encoder qθ(z|x) and decoder pθ(xˆ|z), formally defined by:
LREθ = −γ
1
N
N−1∑
i=0
[xicat log(xˆ
i
cat)] + (1− γ)
1
N
N−1∑
i=0
[(xicon − xˆicon)2] (2)
where xi = 0, ..., N − 1 ∼ qd(x) and N denotes the size of the training batch. The parameter γ
balances both, (a) the cross-entropy loss obtained for each entry’s categorical attributes xˆcat and (b)
the mean-squared-error loss obtained for its continuous attributes xˆcon. In the regularization phase,
we optimize the adversarial loss LDIθ,φ as proposed in [21], when optimizing the parameters θ of the
generator qθ(z|x) and the parameters φ of the discriminator dφ(z), formally defined by:
LDIθ,φ = −
1
N
N−1∑
i=0
[log dφ(z
i)]− 1
N
2N∑
j=N
[log(1− dφ(qθ(xi))] (3)
where zi = 0, ..., N −1 ∼ pn(z) and xi = N, ..., 2N ∼ pd(x) and N denotes the size of the training
batch. We train the three networks that constitute the AAE in parallel with mini-batch wise stochastic
gradient descent for max. of 10, 000 training epochs and apply early stopping once LREθ converges
(architectural details and training parameters are outlined in the appendixes). To disentangle the
journal entries generative latent factors, we sample from a prior distribution pn(z) that constitutes an
equidistant grid of τ isotropic Gaussians denoted by N (µ, I), where µ ∈ R2. Figure 3 (left) shows
an exemplary prior consisting of a 2D-grid of τ = 25 equidistant Gaussians.
4.4 Latent Factor Disentanglement
Upon successful training, we qualitatively inspect the learned disentanglement of the high- and low-
order generative latent factors learned, as represented in qd(z). First, we examine the disentanglement
of the high-order generative factors by investigating the distinct Gaussians of the posterior. Figure 3
(middle) shows an exemplary learned posterior probability distribution of Data-A and its partitioning
into τ = 25 Gaussians. The investigation revealed that each Gaussian zk and its underlying journal
entry representations zi correspond to a general accounting process, e.g., (i) automated payment
postings, (ii) incoming vendor invoices, or (iii) material movements. Second, we examine the
3In compliance with strict data privacy regulations, all journal entry attributes of Data-A have been
anonymized using an irreversible one-way hash function during the data extraction process.
4The original dataset is publicly available via the Kaggle predictive modeling and analytics competitions
platform and can be obtained using the following link: https://www.kaggle.com/ntnu-testimon/paysim1.
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Figure 4: Robust adversarial journal entry sampling: (a) the combination sampling map in Z of the
local posting amount attribute in Data-A, (b) the corresponding robustness sampling map, (c) the
obtained adversarial sampling region qs(zk=14) combining (a) and (b) with dφ(z) ≥ 0.568, and,
(d) generated adversarial journal entries XAdv when sampling along the posting amount trajectory
resulting in generated entries that exhibit an increased posting amount.
disentanglement of the low-order generative factors by investigating the distribution of representations
zi that constitute each latent Gaussian. Figure 3 (right) shows the disentangled distribution of the
entries local posting amounts represented by a single Gaussian of Data-A. The investigation revealed
that the distribution of each Gaussian disentangles the nuances of the general accounting processes,
e.g., (i) posted general-ledger accounts, (ii) posting amounts, or (iii) distinct vendors.
5 Creation of Adversarial Accounting Records
To prepare for a potential sampling of adversarial journal entries, we conduct a detailed analysis of
the models generative latent factors. Thereby, we sample equidistant in Z with zi ∈ [−1, 1] using an
Euclidean distance of δ = 10−4 between two neighboring samples zi and zl with i 6= l. For each
sample we empirically investigate its attribute combination and attribute robustness:
Attribute combination analysis: First, we analyze from which region in Z to sample to generate
entries that exhibit a desired attribute value combination characteristic, e.g., the chance of generating
a particular general-ledger, posting amount, and vendor combination. Given the AAE’s decoder
pθ(xˆ|z), for each sample zi ∈ Z we derive its possibility of generating a particular attribute value
xˆj . We are interested in likelihood trajectories where a traversal step δ in Z results in a transition of
one attribute value into another, formally denoted by max pθ(xˆj |z) 6= max pθ(xˆj |z + δ). Figure 4
(a) shows the latent combination sample map of the journal entries local posting amount attribute
derived by the analysis of Data-A.
Attribute robustness analysis: Second, we analyze from which region in Z to sample to generate
entries that exhibit a desired attribute value combination robustness, e.g., the likelihood of observing
a specific general-ledger, posting amount, and vendor combination. Given the AAE’s discriminator
dφ(z), for each sample zi ∈ Z we derive its likelihood of originating from the learned posterior. A
high likelihood signifies the entry’s compliance with the disentangled latent generative factors of the
regular population of journal entries X . We are interested in likelihood trajectories where a traversal
step δ in Z results in a significant likelihood change ρ, formally denoted by ‖dφ(z+ δ)‖ ≥ dφ(z)+ρ.
Figure 4 (b) shows the latent robust sample map derived by the analysis of Data-A.
Combining the both analysis results provides a ’blueprint’ of controllable latent factors to generate
robust adversarial journal entries. The objective of a perpetrators is thereby to sample from a latent
space region qs(zk) to generates entries that exhibit a desired combination of fraudulent attribute
values and a high attribute value robustness. Figure 4 (c) illustrates such an exemplary adversarial
sampling region qs(zk=14) obtained for the posting amount attribute in Data-A. Figure 4 (d) depicts a
set of generated adversarial entries when sampling along the posting amount trajectory in qs(zk=14).
The generated entries comply with the regular entries characteristics and don’t appear anomalous due
to an unusual attribute value, e.g., a high posting amount, or an unusual attribute value combination,
e.g., a posting amount and general-ledger that exhibit a low likelihood to co-occur in the set of
regular journal entries. In the following, we describe two exemplary attack scenarios that illustrate
the potential misuse of such a model and attack CAATs. Thereby, each example corresponds to one
of the attack classes initially introduced:
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Table 1: Anomaly replacement: Journal entry that corresponds to an invoice posting exhibiting
an amount of $47,632.45 (top). The posted amount exceeds the organizations approval boarder of
$25,000. Adversarial journal entries, sampled from the learned model of Data-A (bottom). The
sampled journal entries split the overall invoice amount (varied attribute values in bold) such that the
likelihood of an alert triggered by a CAATs decreases.
Original Company Posting Account GL Profit Amount ... Currency
entry: Code Key Key Account Center Local Key
1 C20 A1 C1 B1 C20 47,632.45 ... C7
Generated Company Posting Account GL Profit Amount ... Currency
entries: Code Key Key Account Center Local Key
1 C20 A1 C1 B1 C20 2,381.62 ... C7
2 C20 A1 C1 B1 C20 4,763.25 ... C7
3 C20 A1 C1 B1 C20 11,908.11 ... C7
4 C20 A1 C1 B1 C20 9,526.49 ... C7
5 C20 A1 C1 B1 C20 19,052,98 ... C7
Table 2: Anomaly augmentation: Journal entry that corresponds to payment posting booked to seldom
used general ledger account ’B24’ (top). Adversarial journal entries, sampled from the learned model
of Data-A (bottom). The sampled entries augment the single payment posting, and obfuscate the
isolated posting (not varied attribute values in bold) such that the likelihood of an alert triggered by a
CAATs decreases.
Original Company Posting Account GL Profit Amount ... Currency
entry: Code Key Key Account Center Local Key
1 C20 A2 C2 B24 C1 8,920.00 ... C1
Generated Company Posting Account GL Profit Amount ... Currency
entries: Code Key Key Account Center Local Key
1 C20 A2 C2 B24 C1 8,082.08 ... C1
2 C20 A2 C2 B24 C3 9,132.10 ... C1
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
14 C20 A2 C2 B24 C5 7,399.45 ... C1
15 C20 A2 C2 B24 C3 8,555.00 ... C1
... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
An example of the anomaly replacement attack scenario is illustrated in Tab. 1. The to be replaced
journal entry corresponds to an invoice posting exhibiting a total amount of $47,632.45. The posting
amount exceeds the organizations invoice approval border of $25,0000 and may violate an internal
control. To remain undetected by rule-based CAATs, five adversarial journal entries XAdv are
sampled from the learned adversarial sampling region qs(zk=14) of Data-A (bottom). The sampled
entries split the overall invoice amount into smaller amounts, each below the designated approval
boarder. The sampling is achieved by traversing the latent factor trajectory of the amount attribute
value while conditioning on the remaining attribute values of the to be replaced entry.
An example of the anomaly augmentation attack scenario is illustrated in Tab. 2. The to be augmented
journal entry corresponds to a single payment posting booked to general ledger account ’B24’ (top).
To remain undetected by statistical CAATs, several adversarial journal entries XAdv are sampled
from qs(zk=14) of Data-A (bottom). The sampled entries augment the single payment posting and
obfuscate the isolated posting not to be detected as an anomaly in terms of seldom booked general
ledger accounts. The sampling is achieved by conditioning on the general ledger attribute while
traversing the remaining latent factor trajectories of the entry to be augmented.
6 Conclusion
In this work, we conducted a first analysis of the potential impact of ’deepfake’ accounting records in
the context of financial audits. We introduced a thread model to camouflage fraudulent activities in
real-world journal entry data recorded in ERP systems. We demonstrated that deep neural networks
can be trained in an adversarial setup to disentangle the entries underlying latent generative factors.
We also provided initial evidence that such a model of disentangled latent generative factors can be
maliciously misused by a potential perpetrator to attack CAATs regularly applied in financial audits.
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Appendix A - Architectural Details
Our architectural setup follows the AAE architecture [41], as shown in Fig. 2, comprised of three
distinct neural networks that we trained in parallel. In the encoder network qθ we use Leaky Rectified
Linear Unit (LReLU) activation functions [57] except in the last "bottleneck" layer where we use
a Hyperbolic Tangent (Tanh) activation. In both, the decoder network pθ and the discriminator dφ
network, we use LReLUs in all layers except for the output layers. In the output layer, we use a
Sigmoid (Sigm) activation. Table 3 depicts the architectural details of the networks in terms of the
applied activation functions and trained number of neurons per network layer. The AAE architecture
is implemented using the PyTorch machine learning library as introduced in [46].
Table 3: Activation function and number of neurons per layer of the distinct networks that constitute
the AAE architecture: encoder qθ, decoder pθ and discriminator dφ neural network (the subscript
denotes the number of neurons per layer).
Architecture Data-A
x ∈ R401 qθ(z|x) LReLU256 → LReLU128 → ...→ LReLU16 → LReLU8 → Tanh2
z ∈ R2 pθ(xˆ|z) LReLU8 → LReLU16 → ...→ LReLU128 → LReLU256 → Sigm401
z ∈ R2 dφ(z) LReLU128 → LReLU64 → LReLU32 → LReLU16 → Sigm1
Architecture Data-B
x ∈ R618 qθ(z|x) LReLU256 → LReLU64 → LReLU16 → Tanh2
z ∈ R2 pθ(xˆ|z) LReLU16 → LReLU64 → LReLU256 → Sigm618
z ∈ R2 dφ(z) LReLU256 → LReLU64 → LReLU16 → Sigm1
Appendix B - Experimental Details
We train each AAE architecture with mini-batch wise stochastic gradient descent for a max. of 10,000
training epochs and apply early stopping once the reconstruction loss converges. In accordance
with [57] we set the scaling factor of the LReLUs to α = 0.4 and initialize the AAE parameters as
described in [20]. A mini-batch size of 128 journal entries is used in both the reconstruction and the
regularization phase. We use Adam optimization as proposed in [30] and set β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.999,
and  = 10−09 when optimizing the network parameters. Training stability is a main challenge
in adversarial training [4] and we face a variety of collapsing and non-convergence scenarios. To
determine a stable training setup we sweep the learning rates η of the encoder and decoder networks
through the interval η ∈ [10−05, 10−02], and the learning rates of the discriminator network through
the interval η ∈ [10−07, 10−03]. Ultimately, we use the following constant learning rates to learn
a stable model of each dataset, Data-A: η = 10−4 for the encoder and decoder, η = 10−5 for the
discriminator; and, Data-B: η = 10−3 for the encoder and decoder, η = 10−5 for the discriminator.
Figure 5 illustrates the reconstruction LREθ and discrimination-loss LDIθ,φ evaluated for both datasets
and varying learning rates η with progressing training epochs.
Figure 5: Exemplary AAE reconstruction LREθ and discrimination-losses LDIθ,φ evaluated for Data-A
(left) and Data-B (right) as well as varying learning rates η with progressing training 5,000 epochs.
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Appendix C - High-Order Latent Factor Disentanglement
To determine a semantic disentanglement of the journal entries high-order generative latent factors,
we sample from a prior distribution pn(z) that constitutes an equidistant grid of τ multivariate
isotropic Gaussians N (µ, I), where µ ∈ R2. In this initial work, we evaluate when sampling of
τ ∈ {9, 25, 36, 64} Gaussians in Data-A and τ ∈ {9, 25, 36, 49, 64, 81} Gaussians in Data-B. Figure
6 shows the aggregated posterior distributions qd(z) learned when training the AAE architecture up to
10,000 training epochs on both datasets. The examination of the entries represented by each Gaussian
exhibit a high semantic similarity and correspond to general generative accounting processes evident
in the data, e.g., (a) automated payment runs, (b) vendor invoices, and (c) material movements. We
noticed that when increasing the number τ of distinct Gaussians, each Gaussian starts to represent an
even more granular accounting (sub-)process.
Figure 6: Aggregated posterior distributions qd(z) learned when training the AAE architecture for
up to 10,000 training epochs. Learned posterior qd(z) of Data-A when sampling from a prior pn(z)
consisting of an equidistant 2D-grid of τ ∈ {9, 25, 36, 64} isotropic Gaussians (top row). Learned
posterior qd(z) of Data-B when sampling from a prior pn(z) consisting of an equidistant 2D-grid of
τ ∈ {36, 49, 64, 81} isotropic Gaussians (bottom row).
Appendix D - Low-Order Latent Factor Disentanglement
To determine a semantic disentanglement of the journal entries low-order generative latent factors
we obtain human interpretable sampling maps that show the results of (a) the attribute combination
analysis and (b) the attribute robustness analysis in both datasets. Combining the analyses provides
a ’blueprint’ of controllable latent factors to generate robust adversarial journal entries. Figures 7
and 8 show exemplary robust and combination sample maps obtained of a single Gaussian zk=14
(Data-A) and zk=15 (Data-B) respectively. The distinct colour-levels of the combination sample
maps denote the by the decoder network pθ(xˆ|z) generated attribute value when sampling zi from a
particular region in Z. The white contours denote the distinct robustness levels when sampling zi
from a particular region in Z. The obtained robustness determines the likelihood of the generated
entry of originating from the learned posterior pd(z) and therefore complying with the generative
factors of the journal entries.
13
Figure 7: Exemplary robust sample map obtained for Gaussian zk=14 in Data-A (top-left) and
corresponding combination sample maps of the distinct journal entry attributes xj (others). The
corresponding AAE model is trained for 10,000 training epochs imposing a prior comprised of
τ = 25 equidistant isotropic Gaussians.
Figure 8: Exemplary robust sample map obtained for Gaussian zk=15 in Data-B (top-left) and
corresponding combination sample maps of the distinct journal entry attributes xj (others). The
corresponding AAE model is trained for 10,000 training epochs imposing a prior comprised of
τ = 25 equidistant isotropic Gaussians.
Appendix E - Robust Sampling of Adversarial Journal Entries
Figure 9 illustrates an exemplary traversal in the adversarial sampling region qs(zk=15) learned
from Data-B. The sampling region is determined by dφ(zi) ≥ 0.49 and is conducted equidistant in
z1 ∈ [−0.2; 0.6] while conditioning on z2 = 0 using an Euclidean distance of δ = 0.02 between two
neighboring samples zi and zl with i 6= l. Given the learned AAE’s decoder pθ(xˆ|z), each sample
zi ∈ Z generates an adversarial journal entry XAdv exhibiting the attribute values illustrated in the
distinct combination sample maps of Fig. 8. It can be observed that traversing the z1-dimension
controls (among other attributes) the local posting amount of the by the decoder generated entries
shown in Tab. 4. Traversing towards the mode of the adversarial sampling region results in an
increased dφ(z) robustness of the generated journal entries against the CAATS usually applied by
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auditors. Hence, the likelihood of being generated by the same latent factor distributions as the
regular journal entry population increases. Figure 10 illustrates a random sampling outside of the
same adversarial sampling region. It can be observed that traversing away from the adversarial
sampling region results in journal entries that exhibit an ’unusual’ high or low posting amount. Hence,
the likelihood of being generated by the same latent factor distributions as the regular journal entry
population decreases.
Figure 9: Exemplary equidistant traversal in z1 ∈ [−0.2; 0.6] with δ = 0.02 while keeping z2 = 0
fixed in the adversarial sampling region qs(zk=15) of Data-B. Sample ids i are denoted by the black
arrows of the adversarial sampling maps. The individual journal entries generated per sample zi in
qs(zk) are shown in Tab. 4.
Figure 10: Exemplary random sampling outside of the adversarial sampling region qs(zk=15) in
z1 ∈ [−0.2; 0.6] and z2 ∈ [0.15;−0.15] of Data-B. Sample ids i are denoted by the black arrows of
the adversarial sampling maps. The individual journal entries generated per sample zi in qs(zk) are
shown in Tab. 5
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Table 4: Generated journal entries of each sample id i when equidistant traversing the z1-dimension
in qs(zk=15) with δ = 0.02 and corresponding adversarial robustness dφ(z). Traversing away from
the sampling region mode results in a likelihood increase of not being generated by the same latent
factor distributions as the regular journal entry population. As a result, the likelihood of an alert
triggered by a CAATs increases.
Company Posting Account GL Profit Amount ... Currency
Code Key Key Account Center Local Key dφ(zi)
1 C48 A2 C9 B1 C97 125.68 ... C4 0.50
2 C48 A2 C9 B1 C97 165.75 ... C4 0.52
3 C48 A2 C9 B1 C97 214.86 ... C6 0.53
4 C64 A2 C9 B1 C91 271.46 ... C6 0.53
5 C65 A2 C7 B2 C71 262.67 ... C6 0.54
6 C61 A2 C8 B3 C83 625.61 ... C6 0.52
7 C66 A2 C8 B3 C83 1078.08 ... C6 0.51
8 C47 A2 C8 B3 C83 1796.61 ... C6 0.51
9 C47 A2 C8 B3 C83 2899.71 ... C6 0.50
10 C61 A2 C8 B3 C83 4095.49 ... C6 0.49
Table 5: Generated journal entries of each sample id i when sampling randomly outside of the
adversarial sampling region qs(zk=15) with dφ(z) ≤ 0.49 and corresponding adversarial robustness
dφ(z). Traversing away from the sampling region mode results in a likelihood increase of not being
generated by the same latent factor distributions as the regular journal entry population. As a result,
the likelihood of an alert triggered by a CAATs increases.
Company Posting Account GL Profit Amount ... Currency
Code Key Key Account Center Local Key dφ(zi)
1 C71 A3 C9 B1 C97 134.28 ... C5 0.42
2 C37 A3 C8 B3 C83 4236.12 ... C3 0.46
3 C30 A3 C8 B3 C83 10043.45 ... C3 0.46
4 C48 A2 C9 B1 C97 93.65 ... C4 0.42
5 C98 A2 C8 B1 C13 1604.02 ... C9 0.38
6 C98 A2 C8 B3 C83 34278.40 ... C9 0.43
margin
16
